Introduction
Return to Prisoners of Liberation: Four Years in a Chinese Communist Prison
Introduction
“Thought reform”— ssu-hsiang kai-tsao— is a most unfortunate term. It conjures up images of 1984, brainwashing, and various Oriental niceties and as a result diverts us from a serious consideration of the important issues underlying the thought reform process. Stripped of emotionalism and of Cold War and other ideological rhetoric, the fundamental question is: what must be done to get people to act in a particular manner— that is, to have people avoid certain “undesirable” actions and undertake certain other “desirable” ones? Implicit in this question is a series of others. In what manner and on what bases are norms of behavior determined for a society or a group? How are these norms communicated to the public? What means are used to get a group and its members to adhere to the norms? What happens when a person fails to adhere? And finally, what are the human and material costs in carrying out this course of action? Phrased in this manner, the thought reform process is of obvious interest to us, not only because it adds to our understanding of China, but no less importantly because it also concerns problems arising in our own society. Perhaps this entire area would be more understandable if we called it socialization rather than thought reform.
The Chinese subsume under the rubric of thought reform a very wide range of activities. On one end of the spectrum is the intense long-term process, such as the four-year prison experience with several “study sessions” each day described by the Ricketts. Next is a possibly more intense but much shorter-term variation. This often occurs, for example, during “rectification” and other kinds of campaigns when for a limited period of time specific persons are attacked or particular lines of action vigorously promoted. Toward the other end of the spectrum is the “regular” group study sessions that all persons engage in for ten or more hours a week. They study not only political matters, but also try to upgrade their cultural levels and professional skills. In addition, these groups carry out a variety of activities involving management of minor local affairs. Finally, we might also include a kind of self-cultivation whereby an individual studies on his own again, the matters studied vary greatly— to improve himself.
This spectrum of activities can be described in a different manner. In some cases, a person has committed a serious anti-social act and his treatment is the primary order of business. Depending on the intensity of the effort and the amount of time spent, thought reform, if carried out properly, probably could produce a kind of spiritual catharsis and lead to basic changes in attitude and behavior. Even where this does not occur, the person has learned how it must conform his behavior to terminate his present “treatment” and to prevent future conflicts. In other cases, the principal object is not to “cure” a deviant, but rather to prevent deviation from occurring in the first place. This usually takes place during ordinary group or individual study, when people consider what is permissible and impermissible conduct for particular situations, on what bases these distinctions are made, and what are the consequences of non-compliance. This effort is relatively low-keyed and is continuous. Finally, it is important to note that thought reform is not merely a weapon with which to attack deviants nor a prophylaxis to guard against deviation— although the defining and criticizing of anti-social conduct necessarily entails a thorough discussion of what is proper conduct. There are many cases where thought reform also is used in a much more positive and constructive sense to increase political consciousness, to explain social policies, to teach specific techniques, or even to raise the cultural level of the public. Again, much of this takes place through ordinary group or individual study.
It is clear that the methods of thought reform differ greatly for these different tasks. For all the differences, however, there is a central core to these efforts which can be called “the thought reform process.”
In the most general terms, each of the above-described situations begins with a set of people who do not feel the same way about a particular issue. This might be due to disagreements over facts or policy, to ignorance, to indifference, or to anti-social attitudes on the part of some. Each situation ends with everyone more or less in agreement, and with everyone acting in conformity to that agreement. As far as possible, agreement is reached through persuasion rather than coercion, since genuine understanding and acceptance of a policy lead to a higher level of compliance.
More importantly, the thought reform process rests on a fundamental premise that a person’s “thoughts” are in fact “reformable.” This is not as simple a statement as it might appear. Such a premise is intimately linked with one’s philosophical view of the basic nature of man. Without getting too esoteric, the Chinese Communists appear to believe that man is educatable, and perhaps even that man’s nature is basically good. (Fortunately, both the Confucian tradition and Marxist doctrine agree here.) Consequently, when a person behaves improperly, it is possible
to show him the error of his ways and teach him proper behavior. In addition, this process of “reform” is not extremely difficult. A man is not evil by nature and can be educated; going further, if man is by nature good, then when good and evil are presented to him, he will “naturally” choose the former. Approaching the same question from a positive direction, where a group is in disagreement over a particular issue, careful and rational discussion by that group will result, even without outside guidance, in correct decisions almost all the time. This is the basis of the mass line.
I think the Chinese take the idea of the perfectibility of man very seriously and literally. I also think that while the West makes many pious statements about this concept, on the whole we do not believe in it. Thus, our society does virtually nothing to help criminals reform, seems to feel that externally established laws are necessary to control both individuals and officials, and in general believes that, absent such restraining influences, man’s “base” nature will lead him to act in an undesirable and harmful manner— the very opposite of the Chinese mass line. This divergence in philosophical outlook accounts for many of the differences between the two societies and also helps to explain why many of the practices of each society appear so foreign and queer to the other.
A second major aspect of thought reform in China is that there is a great of it. Again, this is not as simple as it sounds. The Chinese devote a staggering amount of human and material resources to this effort. By now, each adult has engaged in perhaps ten thousand hours of regular study sessions. In addition, production sometimes is curtailed so that rectification or other campaigns can be implemented Probably the best illustration of the willingness to spend resources is the Ricketts’ description of the extraordinarily painstaking handling of their own cases. By way of contrast, our society devotes almost no resources to the prison system or to the problems of rehabilitation or post-release reintegration. Similarly, formal programs of socialization and education end after childhood, rather than continue throughout one’s adult life.
It is not entirely clear to me why the Chinese place such great emphasis on thought reform work. Perhaps it is just a “given”: the possession of Truth carries with it the evangelical zeal to convert all non-believers. A variation of this idea might be the traditional Chinese view that the “superior man” had a social duty to teach his less enlightened brethren. Another reason might be that the Chinese view a “just” society as one where each person is able to fulfill his potential. Hence, one’s “good” nature should be promoted and one’s “evil” tendencies eradicated; similarly, if a person deviates from correct conduct, the rest of society has a duty to help salvage him. On a less abstract level, the Chinese may favor the thought reform process because it is an effective and cheap mechanism for communicating orders from the center to the local levels, adapting central directives to local conditions, and ensuring that these orders are carried out.
The “central core” of the thought reform process also involves a common set of specific techniques. Initially, there often is some attempt to disorient a person. This might be done by outright attacks on one’s positions or by posing for discussion (“some comrades say . . .”) questions to which there are not clear answers. The ensuing uncertainty, confusion, and even despair renders a person ready to have his thoughts reoriented along “correct” lines.
The disorientation-reorientation effort makes careful and extensive use of positive incentives. Negative incentives and sanctions are present, of course, and are used when a person is especially recalcitrant. In general, however, coercion is downplayed. The goal of thought reform
is to change one’s way of thinking; and while one may be forced to act in a particular way, one cannot be forced to adopt a particular set of beliefs.
Thus, there usually is not total condemnation of a person. Each man is in part his own creation and in part a product of social conditions. When a person acts improperly, society must bear part of the blame. This approach has several good effects. First, since the fault is not totally one’s own, a person is able to retain some measure of self-esteem— something very important to have if he is to be reintegrated into society. At the same time, society has a responsibility to change those conditions that contributed to the problem. It cannot, for example, abandon a criminal after his reform and release and merely return him to the same milieu from which he had originally come. It also must help to provide educational training, job training, suitable employment, and the like. Finally, a person is provided with a method for carrying out and for rationalizing his reform. He can admit that he had acted improperly in the past and analyze what aspects of his behavior were “caused” by social conditions and what aspects were his own doing. The former will be changed by society; the latter he must change himself. He will do so, of course, since having now seen the “truth,” he “naturally” will choose to act properly. The above considerations were especially important in the years just after Liberation, when many ills could be blamed on the bad conditions in the old society and when the new regime could promise and carry out large and conspicuous changes.
Positive incentives are used more directly in other ways. In the case of a criminal, for example, there is constant stress that total reintegration is in fact possible. Since a person is not basically evil and is educatable, it is possible for him to see the error of his ways and to reform completely. Thereafter, no stigma need attach, and he is just like any other person. Going much further, the former criminal is offered a chance to help to build the New China and to be a part of an exciting and rewarding effort. The attractiveness of this offer cannot be underestimated, since it gives a person purpose and hope.
Part of the positive incentives come in the form of praise for a person’s every improvement and advance. In addition, deeds supplement words and thereby give the words greater weight and reality. Thus, the Ricketts described the teaching of illiterates to read and the promotion to cell leader and the return to dignity of a former cringing, whimpering pickpocket.
The situation is similar in the non-criminal area. The formula of unity-criticism-unity ensures that one does not get condemned for disagreeing, so long as the second unity is reached after the debate. People whose thinking and actions are “progressive” receive much praise. And there also is a stress on being a part of the building of a better and greater New China. In addition, activities such as discussions, debates, and study of central policies involve a considerable amount of local decision making and autonomy. This heightens one’s sense of participation and importance and produces considerable positive incentive to participate to an even larger extent.
Another important characteristic of the thought reform process is the use of “small groups.” Everyone belongs to one or more such groups where he lives, works, or has other principal associations. These groups consist of twenty or so people. They meet frequently and handle a wide range of functions, including being the focal points where much information and policy from above are disseminated to the public. Thus, on any particular issue, the group members will study relevant materials and discuss the pros and cons. In the process, broad central directives are translated into local terms; this includes the clarification of
ambiguities and the opportunity to introduce local initiatives and variations. The final result is that each person knows quite clearly “the rules of the game” for that issue. Presumably, he also has internalized the norms of behavior described by the central policy and refined by the concrete local discussion. The group’s role does not end here. Thereafter, members continue to comment upon each other’s conduct and to “help” whoever may be straying from the correct path. These really are quite desirable features since they enable people to take part in the formulation of the rules governing their own behavior and also let people “police” themselves.
Interaction within a group generally is lively. Nonparticipation in the work of the group is not a possibility, since that in itself is a sign of backwardness and recalcitrance. Beyond that, there appears to be a kind of “group dynamic” that impels people to take part, perhaps much like the dynamics of encounter groups and T-groups in this country.
While I am quite impressed by the potential usefulness of thought reform, I am by no means suggesting that it is a panacea for the problems facing China or any other society. Indeed, thought reform has many severe limitations. For example, this book clearly shows the importance of having an able group leader. If there are many millions of small groups in China, are there many millions of able group leaders? If there are many millions of such able people, are the small groups the place to concentrate them? The answers to both questions might well be yes; we do not know for sure.
Another problem might be that with the passage of time, group interaction becomes more mechanical and leadership more bureaucratic. This might occur because the strident enthusiasm required by the Communists simply cannot be kept up for a long period of time or even because some people are suffering a partial loss of faith as various political and economic policies meet setbacks. The passage of time also might render the thought reform process more difficult to carry out because immediately after Liberation, a person might claim that many of his anti-social tendencies were due to social conditions (from the old society). This is quite difficult to claim twenty-three years after Liberation and consequently most of the “fault” lies within the person himself. Again, we can raise these questions, but we do not know the answers.
This discussion should not be concluded without returning to one of the first points made: thought reform is not something unknown to this society. Can we analogize “regular study sessions” to advertising? Clearly, advertisers believe that advertising works and that people can be convinced to follow certain lines of conduct— i.e., buy certain products. There also is a great deal of advertising consuming large amounts of human and material resources. Positive incentives are stressed (“so many good things will happen to you if you use this product”), although some negative incentives are poised in the background (“embarrassed by dandruff or bad breath?”). Group pressure play an important role (“is your neighbor’s cleaner?”). There even is control of information (“laboratory tests show…”).
Or else, can first-year law school be analogized to intense long-term thought reform? Again, there is a belief that “reform” can be accomplished and a willingness to devote large amounts of resources to it. In addition, considerable disorientation— whether or not intentionally caused by the faculty /group leaders— sets in at the beginning of this process, followed by varying degrees of confusion and despair. At the proper moment, hope is held out (“if you will only learn to think in a lawyer-like manner, everything will clear up”). There is no condemnation of the inner man (“it is not your fault that your liberal arts undergraduate background did not teach you to think clearly”). Positive incentives are used (“you can be a lawyer and do wonderful things”), although negative incentives also are present (embarrassment in front of one’s class mates). And most of all, there is that overpowering group dynamics and peer pressure.
These clearly are not perfect analogies— but then they are not so imperfect either.
Finally. I must comment on the great differences in climate since the Ricketts’ release and the first publication of this book more than fifteen years ago. At that time, there appears to have been questions about the Ricketts’ loyalty, mental stability, and reliability. There certainly was considerable hostility. Even the publishers felt the necessity of including a kind of “apology” cum psychiatrists’ certification in the Publishers’ Introduction. Today that entire sequence looks so ugly and silly. Perhaps truly, the times they are a-changing.
Victor H. Li
Stanford University Law School
1972